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REPLY ARGUMENT

I.

OGDEN AUTO BODY FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF
AND ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER THE "COMING
AND GOING" EXCLUSION APPLIES IN THE PRESENT CASE
A.

Summary of primary and responsive arguments.

In his opening brief, Appellant/Plaintiff Alan Hoskins, Jr. argued that the
trial court committed legal error by talcing from the jury the question of whether
Appellant/Defendant Michael Jatnes Shannon was acting within the course and
scope of his employment with Appellee/Defendant Ogden Auto Body at the time
of the subject accident. 1 Indeed, because Ogden Auto Body received a substantial
benefit from and had control over Shannon at the time of the accident, the "coming
and going" exception is ll}applicable.
In response, Ogden Auto Body begins by arguing that the "undisputed facts"
~

show that the "coming and going" exception applies in this case because Shannon
was not fulfilling a task for it at the moment of the accident, and contends that the
"coming and going" exception applies, as a matter of law, to all "on-call"
employees who drive company vehicles outside of work hours, but are not actively
responding to a service call. Ogden Auto Body also contends that the district court
did not err in talcing the decision of whether Shannon was acting within the course

1

Ogden Auto Body does not dispute that it bears the burden of proving that the
"coming and going" exception applies in this case. See Appellant's Brief pp. 13 14.
1

and scope his employment from the jury because, as a matter of law, it did not
receive a substantial benefit from having Shannon on-call and had no control over
him at the time of the accident.
B.

Utah's "coming and going" exception to the doctrine of respondeat
superior is only a general exception, which is not always
applicable.

Ogden Auto Body contends that the "coming and going" exception
automatically applies to all on-call employees who drive company vehicles outside
of work hours, but who are not actively responding to a service call at the time of
Gw,,

the accident. Appellee's Brief p. 10. This blanket argument is an over generalized
conclusion unsupported by case law.
First, Ogden Auto Body's conclusion relies upon the outcome in Ahlstrom v.
~
'·'
Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315, which was discussed in Hoskin's
opening brief. In Ahlstrom, the Supreme Court applied the "coming and going"
exception to an off-duty police officer who was involved in an accident while
driving home with her infant son in a city owned police car, during off hours.
Contrary to Ogden Auto Body's argument, the court did not suggest that the
outcome in Ahlstrom applied in all on-call cases.

First, the Supreme Court

indicated that its application of the "coming and going" exception in that case was
specific to police car cases:
We may gleam from relevant opinions the conclusion that cities will
not be liable for commuting officers' accidents in the absence of
2

unique circumstances giving rise to a definite need for the officer to
use the patrol car while off-duty. Thus a mere benefit to the city, or
the city's exercise of some control over the use of the vehicle, is not
enough to overcome the general premises of the coming and going
rule.

Id. at 18.
Second, both Ahlstrom and applicable case law make it clear that whether
the "coming and going" exception applies in a given case depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case. Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4, at 1 8.
Ogden Auto Body nonetheless contends, that as a blanket rule, "if an on-call
employee is not actively pursuing his work duties (i.e., responding to a service
call), then the coming-and-going rule applies to bar vicarious liability against the
employer." Appellee's Brief p. 10. This conclusion is unsupported by Ogden Auto
Body's cited case law, including Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986),

Herndon v. Neil, 424 So.2d 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1982), and Short v. Miller, 304
S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). Ogden Auto Body cites no non-police accidentrelated case to support its argument that Shannon is required to have personal
"unique" set of skills to overcome the "coming and going" exception.
In Lane, an employee was driving his employer's van at the time of an
accident. However, the employee first driven home after completing work, and
then, hours later, drove to a bar. When he eventually drove home he was legally
intoxicated. The accident occurred a total of seve~ hours after the employee had

3

left work. The court concluded that the employee "was not performing any act he
was hired to perform and was not motivated in any way by a purpose to serve his
employer at the time of the accident. Therefore as a matter of law, he was not
acting within the scope of his employment at the time the accident occurred." Id
(citations omitted).
Similarly, in Herndon v. Neil, 424 So.2d 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1982), the
Louisiana Court of Appeals found that the employee's "informal type of 'on-call'
situation" placed him within the course and scope of employment. He closed the
business at 9:00 a.m., left in a personal car, drove to a lounge to visit a girlfriend,
and remained there until mid or late afternoon. "It would be ludicrous to say at the
time of this accident Mr. Neil was in any way pursuing his duties as an
employee .... " Id.
Moreover, in Short v. Miller, 304 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), the
employee, while on-call, went for a Saturday morning joy ride with a friend. The
employee had not left any work location and was not required to identify where he
could be reached. He was socializing, and was not pursuing any benefit for the
employer. Id. at 434-435.
The outcomes in these cases do not support an across-the-board conclusion
that that the "coming-and going" exception applies unless an employee is
responding to a service call. Instead, these cases show that the facts and particular

4

circumstances of each case must be examined individually. See Kinne v. Industrial
Comm 'n, 609 P .2d 926, 927 (1980).
In factual contrast to Ogden Auto Body's above-cited cases, Shannon had
recently completed the final call for the day and was on his way home.2 He was
performing an act that he was hired to perform and was primarily motivated by the
purpose to serve his employer at the time of the accident, and his employer had
control over him. Shannon was required to drive the truck home every day and to
have the truck with him at all times.
requirement.

He complied with this mandatory

Ogden Auto Body benefited from him having the truck in his

possession, so he could respond to any and all calls during the evening and could
leave directly from his house to respond to calls. The truck was not permitted to be
used for any other purpose without explicit permission from Ogden Auto Body.
Shannon complied with this rule and only used the truck for personal errands with
permission from Ogden Auto Body's owner. Appellant's Brief pp. 5, 7.
Ogden Auto Body attempts to draw similarities between this case and Lane,
supra. However, the facts in this case are materially different. Unlike in Lane,
Shannon did not first go home and then drive elsewhere to spent hours socializing

2

Ogden Auto Body fails to acknowledge that in contrast with Lane, Herndon, and
Short, the time that passed between Shannon's last call and the accident, was
primarily travel time, while in these cited cases, many hours had passed and the
employees were returning home from social activities.

5

or to use the tow truck for any personal use before the accident occurred. Instead,
Shannon was performing an act he was hired to accomplish for the benefit of
Ogden Auto Body. In further contrast to Lane, Shannon's decision to pick-up
dinner at a drive-thru prior to the accident was only a minor deviation from his oncall, in truck duties, which was both foreseeable and permitted by Ogden Auto
Body (Appellant's Brief p. 9) and was an inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise and
benefit it. See e.g. Lazar v. Thermal Equip. Corp., 148 Cal. App. 3d 458, 466-467
(Cal. App. 2d Dist 1983) (employee who was involved in an accident while on a
detour to purchase food on the way home from work and driving the employer's
vehicle. The detour was foreseeable and reasonable and permitted the application
of the doctrine of respondeat superior); see also Wilson v. Edwards, 138 W. Va.
613,637 (W. Va. 1953).
Under the facts of this case, a reasonable juror could find that Ogden Auto
Body was aware, and expected, that Shannon would use the tow truck to travel to
and from drive-thrus to pick-up food while on call, traveling to and from work.
There is no evidence that Shannon had any other objective in mind than a brief
stop at a drive-thru, or that this was anything but a minor deviation from his route
home.

6

C.

The trial court erred in applying the "coming and going"
exception in this case as a matter of law because a jury could find
that Ogden Auto Body received a substantial benefit from and
had control over Shannon at the time of the accident.

Whether an injury arises out of or within the scope of employment depends
on the particular circumstances of the case. Kinne, 609 P .2d at 927. In Ahlstrom,
the Utah Supreme Court adopted a framework to determine whether the "coming
and going" exception applies by weighing the benefit received and the control of
the employer against the personal nature of the trip on a case by case basis.
Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4,

1 9.

The circumstances of Shannon's employment and

conduct would permit a jury to apply exceptions to the "coming and going"
exception based upon (1) the benefit received by Ogden Auto Body and (2) its
control over Shannon's employment.
1.

Ogden Auto Body received a substantial benefit from
Shannon driving its tow truck home.

Ogden Auto Body contends that, as a matter of law, it did not receive a
substantial benefit by having Shannon drive its tow truck home. Appellee's Brief
pp. 12 -14 (citing Lane, 731 P.2d at 489-490). However, in this case, the benefit
Ogden Auto Body received was much more than Shannon's ability to drive home.
It was a vital necessity that Shannon drive the tow truck home nightly. Ogden
Auto Body required its drivers to take their tow trucks home and remain on-call
and ready in order to respond to service calls at all hours.

7

A jury could find that Shannon was providing a substantial benefit to his
employer by being in possession of the tow truck 24 hours a day and remaining oncall, as the employer itself required. The ability and urgency to quickly respond to
Ogden Auto Body's clients directly affected its compensation and future business.
Shannon's primary motivation for driving the tow truck home was to benefit
Ogden Auto Body, by complying with its mandatory employment requirement to
be able to timely respond to calls as soon as possible. In Lane, by contrast, the
employee was performing no benefit at all for the employer at the time of the
accident. Lane, 731 P.2d at 489-490.
In short, Ogden Auto Body received the exact benefit that it demanded-the
substantial benefit of having Shannon on-call and in possession of its tow truck 24
hours a day to respond directly to any and all calls as needed. Shannon could not
perform most of his work duties without the tow truck. It was a specialized truck
which allowed him to service and tow vehicles. If Shannon did not have the tow
truck, he could not have responded to calls during the time limitations required by
Ogden Auto Body's clients.
A reasonable juror could conclude that Ogden Auto Body failed to meet its
burden of proof, particularly where Shannon regularly does receive calls while oncall, regardless of the time of day, and would have responded ifhe had received a
call the evening of the accident. Shannon's work history shows the significance of

8

his on-call status and the benefit Ogden Auto Body received by his retention of the
-.J

tow truck after hours. 3 The fact that Shannon had not (yet) received a call after
hours on the day of the accident is not determinative of whether the coming and
going exception applies.
2.

Ogden Auto Body retained control of Shannon while he
drove its tow truck home.

Ogden Auto Body retained control of Shannon while he remained in the
truck. Shannon's job, as a salaried employee of Ogden Auto Body, was to be in
and to drive the tow truck to service clients. He had no control over what vehicle
he drove each day- he was required to drive Ogden Auto Body's tow truck, which
it maintained and for which it paid all fuel. He had no control over when he'd
receive a call and where Ogden Auto Body would send him. The tow truck was
not interchangeable with other modes of transportation to fulfill his site-to-site
service calls. Shannon's acceptance of a call at any time was mandatory, and he
could not say no to any call unless he first obtained permission for time-off.
Shannon also had no control of the location from which he would commence
driving home.

3

Between July 1, 2012 and December 1, 2012, Shannon completed 44 calls after
7:00 p.m. In the two months immediately preceding the accident, he cleared 26
calls from Ogden Auto Body after 6:00 p.m. Of those calls, Shannon cleared 16
calls after 7:00 pm and 7 calls after 8:00 p.m. Appellant's Brief pp. 6- 7.
9

On the other hand, Ogden Auto Body's control of Shannon gave it continual
access to its tow truck and the tools to fulfill its services, and thus the continual
ability and means to conduct its business at all hours. 4 It used a GPS system to
know the exact location of its trucks in relation to calls, regardless of the hour.
Ogden Auto Body's control included its maintenance and paying for its fuel.
Ogden Auto Body cites no case law with similar facts to justify taking the
issue of control from the jury. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Ogden
Auto Body retained control over Shannon while he remained in the tow truck,
placing him within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
accident. A reasonable juror could conclude that Shannon was fulfilling a task for
Ogden Auto Body, as directed at the time of the accident - by complying with its
directive to take the tow truck home to support its business purposes.
Accordingly, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Shannon was
"involved wholly or partly in the performance of his master's business or within
the scope of employment." Newman v. Whitewater Wh,irlpool, 2008 UT 79, at ,r 12
(quoting Carter v. Bessey, 93 P.2d 490,493 (Utah 1939)).

4

Call records show that Shannon responded to all of Ogden Auto Body's calls day
and night, went where he was told to go, and remained on-call at all times.
Shannon always complied with Ogden Auto Body's directives.

10

II.
vJ

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY RULING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE "DUAL PURPOSE EXCEPTION" TO THE
"COMING AND GOING" EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS
CASE
A.

Summary of primary and responsive arguments.

Hoskins has argued that even if the "coming and going" exception does
apply, the predominant purpose of Shannon's conduct was for Ogden Auto Body's
benefit and his conduct meets the "dual purpose exception." Ogden Auto Body
argues that the "dual purpose exception" does not apply in this case because
viJ

Shannon's predominant motivation and purpose at the moment of the accident was
to return home and not to perform any immediate task for his employer.

B.

A jury could find that the "dual purpose exception" applies in this
case.

In Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insur. Co., 801 P .2d 934, 93 7 (Utah

1989), the Utah Supreme Court adopted an analysis of the "dual purpose
exception," examining the predominant motivation and purpose of the activity of
the employee, and found that a "useful test" utilized to determine when an
employee's conduct comes under the "dual purpose exception" is "whether the trip
is one which would have required the employer to send another employee over the
same route or to perform the same function if the trip had not been made." Id. at
93 7 (citations omitted).

11

The dual purpose exception applies in the present case. In the substance of
its argument, Ogden Auto Body focuses solely on what Shannon would do once he
arrived home._

This argument fails to acknowledge Shannon's motivation and

purpose in driving the tow truck home, as he was doing at the time of the accident.
The predominant purpose of Shannon's trip was for the benefit of Ogden Auto
Body. His conduct was not personal. As long as he was in the tow truck, he was
expected to respond to any and all calls.

This was not a tangential benefit to

Ogden Auto Body. As noted above, in order to retain its clientele, Ogden Auto
Body required all of its drivers to take their tow trucks home and remain on-call at
all hours.

If Shannon had refused to either take the tow truck home or to respond to
calls while in the truck or at home, Ogden Auto Body would have had to replace
him with someone else to perform the exact same function. Contrary to Ogden
Auto Body's contention, this was not a "tangential benefit." It was an essential
benefit, which enabled Ogden Auto Body to meet its clientele's 20 to 30 minute
response requirement at all hours of the day. It also allowed Shannon to leave his
home and immediately be at work the moment he got into the truck.
Moreover, Ogden Auto Body's argument that the predominant purpose and
function of Shannon's commute was to pick-up food at Kneader's is unsupported
by the record. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Shannon had any other

12

objective in mind than a brief stop at the drive-thru. Ogden Auto Body was aware,
and expected, that Shannon would make minor deviations from his route to pick up
meals and there is no evidence that his visit to a drive-thru was anything but a
minor deviation from his route home. This minor deviation was both foreseeable
and permitted by Ogden Auto Body, and was an inevitable toll of a lawful
enterprise and the benefit given to Ogden Auto Body. See Lazar, 148 Cal.App.3d
at 466-467; see also Wilson, 138 W.Va. at 637.
Ill.
~

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE
"INSTRUMENTALITY EXCEPTION" IN THIS CASE
A.

Summary of primary and responsive arguments.

Hoskins has argued that "instrumentality exception" to the "coming and
going" exception to vicarious liability should be applied in this case because a jury
could find that Ogden Auto Body's control of Shannon outweighs the personal
nature of his journey at the time of the accident. Ogden Auto Body argued that it
derived no benefit from Shannon's drive home (other than having the tow truck
I~

available if needed) and had no control of how and when he arrived home.
B.

The "instrumentality exception" should be presented to the jury
in this case.

Application of the "instrumentality exception" in this case is in line with the
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 cmt. d (1958), and the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Bailey v. Utah State Indus. Comm 'n., 398 P.2d 545 (Utah

13

1965).

5

Contrary to Ogden Auto Body's argument, Vanleeuwen v. Industrial

Comm'n. of Utah, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) is disparate from the present
case, the only similarity being that the employer furnished the employee with a
company vehicle. In Vanleeuwen, however, the primary benefit to the employer
was the employee's mere arrival at work, which not a substantial benefit to the
employer. Id. at 282. (Citation omitted). The employee was not required to
perform any job-related service or use the vehicle as a business instrumentality
while traveling to and from the employer's business office. In the present case, the
tow truck was not merely a vehicle used for Shannon to drive to and from work. It
was his office and provided the instruments to perform his work. The moment he
is in the tow truck, he is at work, and Ogden Auto Body had substantial control
. 6
over h1m.

5

Ogden Auto Body quotes Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 cmt. d, which
states: "The mere fact that the employer supplies a vehicle does not establish that
those who avail themselves of it are within the scope of employment while upon it,
especially if the use is merely casual." But a jury could easily find that Shannon's
purpose in driving the tow truck the evening of the accident was not "merely
casual." Ogden Auto Body's reliance on Restatement (Second) of Agency § 23 5
("an act of a servant is n(?t within the scope of employment if it is done with no
intention to perform it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is
employed") is similarly not applicable in the present case.
6

Ogden Auto Body argues that the instrumentality exception should not be applied
in the present case because it was not applied in Ahlstrom. See Appellee' s Brief p.
24. · However, the "instrumentality exception" was not before the court in
Ahlstrom. Accordingly, Ogden Auto Body's argument is irrelevant.
14

IV.

A JURY COULD FIND THAT OGDEN AUTO BODY RATIFIED
SHANNON'S CONDUCT.

A.

Summary of primary and responsive arguments.

Hoskins argued that even if Shannon was not initially within the course and
scope of his employment, an issue of fact exists regarding whether Ogden Auto
Body is liable under respondeat superior based on its post-accident ratification of
Shannon's actions. Ogden Auto Body argued that there is no authority in Utah or
elsewhere supporting the application of ratification to hold it vicariously liable for
~

the negligent act of Shannon outside the course and scope of his employment.
Ogden Auto Body also contends that its actions are insufficient as a matter of law
to amount to ratification of Shannon's actions.
B.

Utah case law recognizes the application of ratification to hold an
employer Liable for the Negligent Acts of an Employee.

Ogden Auto Body contends that there is no authority in Utah or elsewhere
supporting the application of the doctrine of ratification to hold it vicariously liable
for the negligent act of Shannon outside the course and scope of his employment.
This position is contrary to Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 17 P.2d 256, 259
(1932), where the requirements for ratification were established in a negligence
case. Ogden Auto Body does not dispute that Utah law recognizes the application
of ratification in employment cases. See Jones, 17 P.2d at 259; see also Bradshaw
v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982); Restatement (3d.) of Agency§ 7.04.

15

Ogden Auto Body also contends that Shannon was not "actively doing
anything else for its benefit when he hit Mr. Hoskins." This argument ignores that
at the time of the accident, Shannon was complying with mandatory job
requirements to take the tow truck home, and Ogden Auto Body received the
benefit by requiring the tow truck be taken home for business purposes.
Ogden Auto Body finally contends that ratification should not be applied in
this case because the courts in the cases of Lane, Whitehead, Ahlstrom, and
Newman did not apply it. Ratification was not argued as a theory for vicarious

liability in any of those cases; however, accordingly, Ogden Auto Body's
contention is incorrect.
C.

There is a factual dispute whether Ogden Auto Body ratified
Shannon's actions.

Regardless of whether Shannon was initially acting with the course and
scope of his employment, an issue of fact exists regarding whether Ogden Auto
Body is liable under respondeat superior based on its post-accident ratification of
Shannon's actions. Ogden Auto Body contends that the doctrine of ratification
does not apply because "[m]ere continuance of employment after the accident is
insufficient to show the approval necessary to trigger liability, and legal
representation in a court proceeding does not constitute ratification.
Hoskins does not dispute that continued employment "standing alone,
cannot be sufficient to find ratification." Hughes
16

v. Rivera-Ortiz,

187 N.C. App.

214, 653 S.E.2d 165 (2007), aff'd in part, 362 N.C. 501, 666 S.E.2d 751 (2008).
However, Ogden Auto Body fails to address the additional facts justifying
ratification in the present case, including the undisputed fact that Ogden Auto
VJJ)

Body had actual knowledge of material facts surrounding the accident, and paid
Shannon's citation. Moreover, Ogden Auto Body failed to reprimand or take any
disciplinary action against Shannon. 7

CONCLUSION
Hoskins respectfully urges the Court to reverse the trial court's Order
Granting Defendant Ogden Auto Body's Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Hoskins' respondeat superior claim, and remand this case for trial.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2016.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Scott P. Evans
Stephen D. Kelson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

7

Ogden Auto Body's reliance upon Maier v. Patterson, 553 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Pa.
1982) for the general position that an employer has no duty to discipline an
employee is unsupported. In that case, the employer (a Union) could not initiate
disciplinary action without a Plaintiff first activating the disciplinary action in
filing a complaint. Id. at 155. Failure to discipline is at least one factor that a jury
may consider on the issue of ratification.
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